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Project website: www.each-for.eu
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Synthesis of context

1.1.1. Development & population

According to the 2006 Revision of the United Nations World Population Prospects, China’s population can be expected to grow slowly from 1.31 billion in 2005 to 1.46 billion in 2030. The Work Bank data show that the annual growth rate of population is 0.6% in 2005. With constant fertility, China’s population would begin to decline after 2025, reaching 1.34 billion in 2050. While the number of children was increasing rapidly between 1950 and about 1970, it is now declining significantly, due to China’s strict one-child family planning program. In the next few decades, China will experience a serious process of population aging. It is projected that 31% of all Chinese will be above the age of 60 in the year 2050.¹

China is in a process of rapid urbanization. According to recent estimates by the UN Population Division, China’s urban population increased from some 70 million in 1950 to roughly 530 million in 2005. Rural-urban migration is expected to continue to grow. By 2015, the urban population will surpass the rural population; and by 2030 China will have an urban population of some 875 million people.²

According to the 2000 Population Census, Chinese males have high life expectancy, ranging between 76 years in Shanghai and 62 years in Tibet. Obviously, life expectancy is strongly correlated with economic development, as males in more developed coastal provinces have much higher life expectancy than in interior or western provinces. The life expectancy of Chinese females is higher than men, ranging between 80 years in Shanghai and 66 years in Tibet. In

¹ Source is China-Profile, available at www.china-profile.com/intro/intro_2.htm (last visit 30 July 2007).
² Ibid.
Eastern provinces, the female life expectancy is quite comparable to that of most developed countries in Europe or the Americas.¹

1.1.2. Social-economic trends

China’s economy has seen a constant rapid growth for a decade. According to the data of the World Bank, China’s GDP in 2005 was 2.2 trillion USD. The annual GDP growth rate was 10.2% in 2005, while in 2002 the growth rate was 8.4%. GNI per capita is 1740 USD, compared to 930 USD in 2000.

With a total cumulative FDI of 560 billion US$ between 1989 and 2004, China is one of the largest recipients of outside investment. This investment came primarily (45%) from Hong Kong and Macau. Between 1990 and 2004 the United States and Japan contributed about 9% of the FDI in China. Taiwan directly contributed 7% of foreign investments in China. From 5% to 6% of FDI came from Singapore, South Korea and the Virgin Islands. In contrast, only between 1% and 2% of the cumulated FDI in China came from the UK, Germany, and France since 1990.⁴

China has greatly benefited from participation in the global economy. Both exports and imports increased dramatically since 1978, especially since the country’s WTO accession in 2001. Since 1994, China has seen a large trade surplus. Contrary to popular belief that China is an exporter of cheap plastic toys, electronic junk or textiles, China’s most important export products are machinery and transport equipment. In fact, 93% of China’s exports in 2004 were manufactured goods.⁵

Since 1978, the total number of employed persons in China increased from about 400 to 768 million. The number of employed persons in service industries increased rapidly: from only 48 million in 1978 to 230 million in 2004. Today, in China, more people are working in the service sector than in manufacturing and heavy industries.⁶ Workers’ remittances and compensation has increased from 6.2 billion US$ in 2000 to 22.5 billion US$ in 2005.

However, China started facing unemployment pressure since 1978, particularly after the massive lay-off of SOEs workers, which began in the mid-1990s.⁷ The

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¹ Ibid.

² See www.china-profile.com/data/fig_fdi_3.htm

³ See www.china-profile.com/data/fig_trade_2.htm

⁴ See www.china-profile.com/data/fig_employment_1.htm

⁵ Urban unemployment became significant in 1978 also because a large number of “intellectual youth”, who were sent to rural area for “re-education” during the Cultural Revolution, came back to cities but had great difficulties in finding a job.
unemployment rate is certainly high according to international standards, but accurate data is not available. According to statistics of National Bureau of Statistics of China, the unemployment rate on record in urban areas increased each year from 2.5 percent in 1990 to 4.7 percent in 2004.\(^8\) The number of officially registered unemployed is increasing and has reached around 8 million at the end of 2003.\(^9\) However, the official unemployment rate and relative statistics have been widely questioned by scholars, who criticized that these figures under-estimate the number of unemployed people.\(^10\) The data has caused controversy and there exists different versions with regard to real figures. According to estimates made by scholars and China’s public institutions through empirical survey, China’s real unemployment rate could possibly be double the given figures.\(^11\)

There are huge rural-urban and regional gaps in education within China. While students, on average, have 10 years of education in Beijing, students in Tibet (on average) only have a little more than 3 years. The hinterland of China (such as Qinghai, Guizhou, Ningxia), and Anhui Province, has significantly shorter average education than the coastal region of China (such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shangdong, Guangdong Provinces). According to the World Bank, the literacy rate of China in 2006 was 90.9%.

In general, the education system lacks adequate funding. The government promised in 2004 that the education budget would rise from 2.5% of GDP in 1998 to 4% in 2007. However, the government has had to call on the private sector to help expand the provision of education.

Official development assistance has seen a minor increase, from 1.7 billion US$ in 2000 to 1.8 billion US$ in 2005.

1.1.3. The Political context

The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949 and the Chinese Communist Party has been ruling the country since then. Free-market economic reform has fundamentally transformed the economic structure and significantly raised living standards, but politically, China remains a Marxist-style Party-State.

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\(^9\) Ibid.


National leaders are not elected but promoted from the Party’s political bureaucratic structure.\textsuperscript{12}

The National People’s Congress (NPC) is the national legislature. NPC representatives are replaced every five years. The NPC passes laws and treaties, nominates the executive and approves the constitution. It has around 3000 members, indirectly elected by lower-level people’s congresses. It meets in plenary session for two or three weeks each year, usually in March-April. Between sessions, many of its powers are vested in its standing committee. The legislature is subordinated to the party.\textsuperscript{13}

China has ratified most of major human rights treaties, notably the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.\textsuperscript{14} China also signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998 but has not yet ratified the treaty.

In terms of international labor standards, China has ratified 25 ILO conventions, including four “core” labor conventions: Conventions No. 100 and No. 111 on Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; and Conventions No. 138 and No. 182 on the elimination of child labor.\textsuperscript{15} The latest convention ratified by China is the Convention No. 155 of 1981 on occupational safety and health, which was ratified on Jan. 25, 2007.

China has been criticized for its poor protection of workers’ rights, in particular the often outrageous working conditions of rural migrant workers. In the past years, the government has been trying to tackle the problem mainly by improving the labor legislation. For instance, a Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law was on the 2007 legislative agenda of the Standing Committee of the National

\begin{enumerate}
\item See Country Profile 2007 (China), the Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007, \url{www.eiu.com}.
\item See Country Profile 2007 (China), the Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007, \url{www.eiu.com}.
\item See \url{www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet}.
\item Among 25 ratified ILO conventions, three conventions are denounced by China, available at \url{www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newcountryframeE.htm} (last visited 27 July 2007).
\end{enumerate}
People’s Congress and a preliminary draft was issued very recently.\(^\text{16}\) A draft of the Employment Promotion Law was submitted for comments by the public in 2007.\(^\text{17}\) The first draft of the Labor Contract Law was issued for public comments in 2006 and incited extensive academic and public debates.\(^\text{18}\) After substantial modifications and four drafts, the fourth draft of the Labor Contract Law was finally adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 29 June 2007 and will enter into force on 1\(^\text{st}\) January 2008.\(^\text{19}\)

Nevertheless, new legislation does not necessarily mean much improvement in practice. There are, for example deficiencies in the Chinese judicial system such as lack of independence of the court as well as a major restriction on freedom of association.

Furthermore, independent trade unions are not allowed. All trade unions have to be approved and subordinated to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which is a quasi-governmental organization. The leaders of ACFTU are also senior officials of the State.

1.1.4. Social-cultural aspects

In China, there are 56 officially recognized ethnic groups. These groups vary greatly in the number of population. Of them, the Han ethnic group has the


\(^{17}\) See 就业促进法 (草案) [Employment Promotion Law (draft)], (issued by the NPC, Mar. 25, 2007), available at www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=362938&pdm=110106 (last visited June 10, 2007).

\(^{18}\) See 劳动合同法 (草案) [Labor Contract Law (first draft)], (issued by the NPC, Mar. 20, 2006), available at www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/home/lm_index.jsp?lmid=15&dm=1503 (last visited June 10, 2007). It is worth noting that both the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai and the European Union Chamber of Commerce submitted their comments on the draft to the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the NPC in April 2006, suggesting that the new law might have a negative influence on foreign investment in China. The full text of comments by the American Chamber is available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/files/AmChamChinaLaborLawComments.pdf (last visited June 10, 2007).

\(^{19}\) The Labor Contract Law was adopted by the 28\(^\text{th}\) Session of the Standing Committee of the NPC, available at www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=368169&pdm=1503 (last visited July 10, 2007).
largest population, while the other 55 ethnic groups, with smaller populations, are customarily called “ethnic minorities.”

At the time of the 2005 census of the Chinese government, there were 1,182,950,000 Han Chinese, which was 90.56% of China’s total population. Ethnic minorities, including the Zhuang, the Uighurs and other Tukic groups, the Tibetans, the Mongols and several dozen others, are 12,333,000 in number. Ethnic minorities are growing much faster than the Han population; the former increased by 15.88% compared with the 2000 census, as against a 2.03% rise in the Han population. Ethnic minorities have been granted exemptions from the one-child family policy. For example, Tibetan and Mongol nomads are usually allowed to have three children and often disregard restrictions anyway.

**Table 1: Basic Facts of the Five Ethnic Autonomous Regions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Area (sq km)</th>
<th>Population at the end of 2003 (10,000)</th>
<th>Proportion of ethnic minority population in the total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region</td>
<td>Hohhot City</td>
<td>1197547</td>
<td>2379.61</td>
<td>21.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region</td>
<td>Nanning City</td>
<td>237693</td>
<td>4857.00</td>
<td>38.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet Autonomous</td>
<td>Lhasa City</td>
<td>1274910</td>
<td>259.21</td>
<td>95.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region</td>
<td>Yinchuan City</td>
<td>62818</td>
<td>580.19</td>
<td>35.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region</td>
<td>Urumqi City</td>
<td>1655826</td>
<td>1933.95</td>
<td>60.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Chinese spoken and written language by the Han people is the most commonly used language in China. Chinese, also known as Hanyu or Han Chinese, comprises seven major dialect groups that are composed of over 100 sub-dialects. Except for the Hui and Manchu peoples who use Han Chinese, the remaining 53 ethnic minorities have their own languages. Generally speaking,

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21 See [www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/qqrkpcgb/t20060316_402310923.htm](http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/qqrkpcgb/t20060316_402310923.htm)
one ethnic group uses one language, but there are those that use two or more languages. Because of this, there are a total of 72 ethnic minority languages being used in China today.\textsuperscript{22}

According to the official information of China, there are seven national religious organizations in China. They are the Buddhist Association of China, China Taoist Association, Islamic Association of China, Patriotic Association of the Catholic Church in China, Chinese Catholic Bishops College, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches of China and the China Christian Council. All the religious organizations elect leaders and leading bodies according to their own articles of association.\textsuperscript{23}

According to the 2005 census of the Chinese government, the average household size in urban areas is 2.97 persons, and in rural areas is 3.27 persons.\textsuperscript{24} Compared to the 2000 census, the average household size declined by 0.31 persons per household.

\textbf{1.2 Brief overview of environmental problems}

\textbf{1.2.1 General Overview}

China is located in the southeast of the Eurasian landmass, bounded by the Pacific Ocean in the southeast. The total area is 9,598,030 km\textsuperscript{2} and consists of mountains (33\%), high plateaus (26\%) and deserts in the west and plains (12\%), deltas and hills (10\%) in the east (FAO AQUASTAT, CIA 2007). The climate is accordingly extremely diverse ranging from tropical in the south to subarctic in the north and vast areas are under the influence of the East Asia Monsoon. Cold, dry winters and hot summers are typical for continental part of the country.

With over 1.31 billion people, China has the largest population of any country in the world. Almost half of the total population lives along the rivers (= 8\% of total landmass).

China’s complex climatic and varied geological conditions expose the country to virtually every type of known natural disaster. These events are estimated to affect an average of one out of six people and lead to several thousand fatalities in China each year. Despite immense economic growth in the last 20 years, there has been an increase of poverty in areas exposed to natural hazards.

\textsuperscript{22} See www.china.org.cn/english/en-xx2005/sh/sh-yy.htm


\textsuperscript{24} See www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/t20060316_402310923.htm
The most frequent events are typhoons (about five per year along the southern and eastern coasts); damaging floods; tsunamis; earthquakes; droughts and land slides.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disaster Type</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Homeless</th>
<th>Affected</th>
<th>Damage US $(thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>6.593.552.00</td>
<td>822.168</td>
<td>41.270.429</td>
<td>1.530.455.582</td>
<td>126.271.778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>784.751</td>
<td>228.193</td>
<td>3.867.667</td>
<td>17.044.147</td>
<td>8.056.807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slides</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.748</td>
<td>2.748</td>
<td>16.219</td>
<td>71.246</td>
<td>952.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.503.400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>208.705.000</td>
<td>14.960.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.561.487</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.823</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Temperature</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>3.700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33.180</td>
<td>5.910.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Some currently relevant environmental issues resulting from rapid economic growth and industrialization (SwissRe 2006; IPCC 2007) are:
- air pollution and acid rain (greenhouse gases, sulphur dioxide, particulates) from reliance on coal;
- water shortages, particularly in the north; water pollution from untreated wastes in coastal areas;
- deforestation (14 % forest cover left);
- estimated loss of one-fifth of agricultural land since 1949 to soil erosion and economic development; food production continues to increase but potential for expansion is limited because of hilly areas, degradation or salinization;27% of total national territory combats the ripple effects of desertification;
- reduction of river runoff (lake shrinkage, contraction of wetlands as consequences);
- climate became warmer and drier in the north; this leads to more frequent droughts..

1.2.2 “Hot spots” of environmental degradation & vulnerability

Three Gorges Dam on Yangtze River

The Yangtze River is considered “China’s Lifeline” (PBS 2007). The river has its source in the Himalayan Mountains and stretches 3,700 miles to the Yellow Sea/Shanghai. As the world’s third longest river, the Yangtze flows through a region that is home to more than 320 million people. For centuries it was used as a central highway for trade, transportation, spiritual pilgrimage and in modern
times as a tourist attraction. It provides sustenance for people who are living on its banks through the use of fertile plains and fishery.

The Three Gorges Dam is the largest hydro-electric project in the world and it is one of the few man-made structures visible from space. After 13 years of construction in 2006 the reservoir had submerged 13 cities, 140 towns, 1350 villages and about 1600 factories.

![Fig. 1: Size of the flooded area](PBS 2007)

The dam is meant to produce clean and renewable electrical power equivalent to the production of 15 nuclear power plants. The second goal of the dam is flood control, as in the last 2,000 years the Yangtze River has experienced 215 devastating floods.

However, there are major environmental hazards resulting from this prestige project. Toxins associated with industry and mining will endanger the survival of people and animals in this area. Also 265 billion gallons of raw sewage are dumped into the river annually. Because of the dam, natural flushing out is impossible now. Moreover some hydrologists even say the Yangtze's heavy load of sediment and its shifting floor of gravel could hamper the dam's turbines and fill the bottom of the reservoir, causing even worse flooding (WP 2006, YDPN 2007).

**Desertification**

China is one of the countries suffering the most serious desertification in the world (EP 2001). Dust storms in China are on the rise, probably as a result of land degradation, such as deforestation, overgrazing and drought. The Gobi Desert expanded by 52,400 km² from 1994 to 1999 and occupies altogether 1,296,000 km² of land, and is slowly moving towards Beijing (EPI 2003). Neighbouring countries like Korea and Japan are also affected by more and more dust storms that originate in China.
1.2.3 Adaptation and state-capacities

Energy and flood control

Officially the Chinese government claims that the Three Gorges dam provides control of the unpredictable river, saving people living along the banks. Perhaps more significantly, they view the project as a symbol of national pride. The government also estimates that energy from the dam will increase industrial output and generate millions of desperately needed jobs. Therefore the government has suppressed negative information about the project. Furthermore, the Five-Year Program (2006-10) plans a 20% reduction in energy consumption by 2010. Basic goals are conserving resources and protecting the environment (PBS 2007).

Flood control in general changed since 1998 from structural measures (reservoirs, flood storage) to flood prevention projects like afforestation campaigns.

Afforestation (against desertification and soil erosion)

The most effective measure to combat land degradation is to build windbreaks. Over the past 20 years, more than seven billion Chinese citizens have participated in voluntary afforestation activities, planting more than 35 billion trees across the country. Another 26 million ha of trees are already planted by the windbreaker belt project in the northeast, north and northwest of China known as the "No.1 Ecological Project in the World" (EP 2001).

Creation of Pooling Schemes
The government has created a legal framework necessary for a risk sharing community to deal with financial consequences of natural disasters. They want to consider some form of private-public partnership given the respective income levels of many household and businesses in high-risk areas.

1.2.4 Environmental change and conflict

Three Gorges Dam

After flooding the reservoir, between one and two million people have lost their homes and had to move away. Aside from the loss of cultural history and art, the destruction of the natural river and negative effects on wildlife, many of those who have moved are having trouble adapting to new communities and jobs because of missing knowledge and low education. Furthermore, they settled in already densely populated areas where other problems like poverty, pollution and unemployment already exist. Though the government said it planned to spend about $5 billion to compensate people forced to resettle, many of them never received any aid. Additionally, a big problem was prevalent corruption between government and the constructors of the dam. Moreover, many cases of human rights abuses were published by the international press and NGOs like Amnesty International.

Today over 360 million people live within the watershed of the Yangtze River and in the case of a dam collapse, millions of people who live downstream would be endangered (PBS 2007).

Dust storms / Desertification

Desertification has brought about a sharp decrease in usable land, accelerated deterioration of the environment, worsened the poverty of the people living in the desert area and caused huge economic losses to the country. The dust storms can be hazardous to public health both in terms of air quality and visibility. But the social-economical damage through the storms is immense. Rural people lost their basic resources and were forced to migrate eastward. Expanding deserts are threatening 4,000 villages which could become overrun by drifting sands (Asian Development Bank).

1.2.5 Scenarios for the future

Increasing flood events will be caused by Himalayan glaciers, which are receding faster than anywhere else in the world. Glacial melt water could serious affect 500 million people in the Himalayan- Hindu- Kush region and a quarter of a
billion people living downstream. Global warming could lead to the disappearance of these glaciers by 2035, or even sooner (IPCC Report 2007).

The reforested area is expected to extend to 30 million hectares in 2010 – about 17% of the total land area (UNEP 2002). Rising industrialization, urbanization and population growth could easily worsen water pollution, especially in coastal areas. On the other hand, water quality of some inland rivers could improve.

1.3. Brief overview of migration processes

1.3.1 General overview and historical development

Emigration is not a new phenomenon for the Chinese. Chinese immigrants are among the most ancient diasporas in the world. In general, the history of the Chinese emigration can be divided into five main stages. Each of these stages represents different patterns of migration.

Chinese emigration can be traced back to the 15th century. The first wave of emigration was between 1400 and 1430 in the direction of South-East Asia.

The second wave, which was larger, took place in the last quarter of the 19th century, after the Opium War. Emigrating Chinese were mainly from the southeastern coastal provinces of the country, such as Fujian and Zhejiang Province. The destinations were mainly Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Some went to Hawaii, Western Indian Islands, Australia, California, Africa especially Mauritius and South Africa, and Europe. Chinese who came to Europe were mainly marines from Guangdong and Fujian Province, recruited by the shipping companies in Europe. There were also a limited number of small merchants from Qingtian and Wenzhou of Zhejiang Province. It was reported that more than 2 millions of Chinese emigrated abroad at that time, mainly as cheap labor. This wave created the most significant overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, America, and Africa. (Nyiri 1999:14)

The third stage was between the beginning of 20th century and 1950. During World War I, the UK, France and Russia recruited more than 200,000 Chinese workers to build railways and to conduct other hard labor for the war. Some of these workers stayed after the war. There were also a small number of Chinese students who stayed in Europe after the war. Chinese emigrants before the 1950s were exclusively male.

The 4th stage was between the 1950s and 1979. During this period, the People’s Republic of China was “closed” to the outside world and movement of population was strictly controlled. Chinese emigrants during this time were mainly from
Hong Kong and Chinese from South-East Asia. The economic depression in Hong Kong in the 1960s drove a large number of peasants from the New Territories to Europe. They mainly engaged in Chinese catering businesses and profited from the “Golden 60s” of Europe and realized social upgrading within one generation (Pang: 2004). The end of the Indo-Chinese conflict in 1975 marked an upsurge of Asian emigration. For example, around 50,000 ethnic Chinese, mainly Teochew, refugees, arrived in France between 1975 and 1979, most of them businessmen, students, and artisans fleeing the communist regime. (Nyiri, 2002: 121) A number of refugees and students from Hong Kong and Taiwan went to the USA (Ma 2003: 165).

The 5th stage starts from 1979, since which Mainland China has pursued an open door policy with the focus on economic reform. At the same time, the government loosened its control over the movement of persons, which was strictly controlled by the household registration system known as hukou during the pre-reform era (1949-1979). Since the reform started, China has undergone a boom in both internal and international migration, which accelerated in the 1990s (Nyiri 1999:1). As Chinese immigrants before the 1980s are often called “old migrants”, those who emigrated from Mainland China after the 1980s are called “new migrants.” “New migrants” are discussed in more detail in the following section.

IOM shows that the Chinese are the largest Diaspora in the world, with 35 million Chinese living outside of China. According to one scholar’s estimate, in 2000, there were around 33.3 million Chinese living outside of China. Among them, 77.3% of overseas Chinese reside in South-East Asian countries; 11.6% (3.8 million) Chinese live in the USA; and 8.4% (2.8 million) live in Europe. (Li 2000) IOM has identified the following significant features in the migration field in contemporary China:

- Labor migration movements from rural to urban areas and overseas (there has also been some irregular migration)
- Emigration in greater numbers from non-traditional source areas;
- Sustained numbers of students going abroad for study.

1.3.2 Main migration patterns and trends

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26 Data are from World Migration 2005, available at www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/255 (last visit 26 July 2007).
27 See www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/138 (last visit by 20 July 2007).
Internal migration in China

Since China’s economic reform started in the 1980s, China has seen a huge wave of internal migrant workers moving from the countryside to cities and from western and central regions to coastal regions. According to the official statistical data, there were around 147 millions of internal migrants in Mainland China in 2005. Among them, 477 millions were cross-provincial migrants.  

According to official statistic data, at the end of 2004, there were 757.05 million rural people, constituting 58.2% of the whole Chinese population. Among them, around 100 million were working in cities. During the past five years, the number of rural migrant workers increased by six to eight million each year. Even though working in the city without a “work permit” is illegal; millions of rural laborers still choose to go to cities to find a job. An important reason is the widening urban-rural and regional disparity. In addition, the long lasting strict control of labor mobility by the hukou system also caused surplus labor in rural areas.

Internal migration not only takes the form of rural-urban movement, but also interregional movement, which is closely correlated with regional differentials in foreign investment and state investment. Since the reform, regional disparity also increased tremendously. Coastal regions enjoy preferential government policies for attracting foreign investment and developing township and village enterprises. The prospering economy and increased income attracts laborers from central and hinterland regions.

International emigration from China

Since the 1980s when the reform started, China improved its diplomatic relationship with many industrialized countries such as the USA and Japan, and started sending students to these countries. The population control policy was also loosened. Emigration became possible. The main destinations were the

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28 See www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/qqrkpcgb/t20060316_402310923.htm (last visit by 26 July 2007).
29 See the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China: www.stats.gov.cn
USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, and South Africa. It is estimated by scholars that during two decades after 1979, the number of Chinese emigrating abroad was between one and two million (Ren 2002). The majority of these migrants went to North America. In terms of the migration pattern, emigration from Mainland China can be divided into four categories.

The first category is Chinese students. It is estimated that from 1978 onwards, Mainland China sent 320,000 students to America, Europe, Australia and Japan. The most popular destination is Japan, hosting 47,073 Chinese students. The USA is at the second place, hosting 46,985 Chinese students. Only around 110,000 went back to China after completing their study abroad. In other words, two thirds of the Chinese students stayed in the host country and became the so-called “new migrants”. Taking into account self-supported students, China has altogether around 400,000 students going abroad to study.

The second category can be called “technical emigrants” or “investment emigrants”. This category of Chinese mainly went to Canada, Austria and South-Africa where immigration policies allow technical and investment immigrants.

The third category is “marriage emigrants” or “family reunification emigrants”. This category of Chinese mainly marry overseas Chinese or non-Chinese and immigrate to the host country for family reunification. It is worth noting that in the coastal region where there is a tradition of emigration, mainly in Fujian Province and Zhejiang Province, many Chinese immigrate to Europe through family reunification. For example, there have been more than 500,000 Chinese from Fujian Province emigrating abroad. Among them, 90 percent are family reunification migrants. In Qintian of Zhejiang Province, there have been 150,000 people emigrating to over 70 countries or areas in the world. The majority of them emigrated through “chain migration” during the two decades after the economic reform started (Ren 2002).

The fourth category is illegal emigrants. Certain areas in China such as Zhejiang Province and Fujian Province, which has a local tradition of emigration, have experienced a mass departure of illegal migrants since the reform. Before their departure, they normally had already obtained some information about their routes and destination from returnees who had already experienced this travel. Although human smugglers frequently use modern transportation and communication means, methods of entering the destination country frequently have the same patterns as that of the “coolie trade” of the 19th century. (Nyiri, 2002: 3). Illegal migrants are often in danger such as asphyxiation in trucks. Most illegal migrants are unprepared to live in the very different culture of the host country. Migrants furthermore often have a very limited knowledge of the local language of the host society. As such, newcomers often have to depend
on their Chinese predecessors, who may take advantage of the vulnerability of the newcomer.

Compared to “old migrants”, “new migrants” have the following characteristics. First, compared to old migrants who were rather forced to leave China because of war or poverty, the migration of new migrants to relocate can be considered more voluntary in that it is rather a choice made in search for a better life abroad.

Second, while old migrants are almost exclusively from the coastal regions of China, new migrants are from various parts of China.

Third, old migrants are mainly low-skilled peasants or workers but many new migrants are students, highly skilled technician or professional, and businessmen.

Fourth, while old migrants are exclusively male, new migrants have a more balanced gender ratio.

In the past years, Chinese migration has presented some new trends and new directions. First, Russia and Eastern European countries such as Hungary and Romania have become the new “lands of opportunity” for Chinese immigrants. This is because of their geographic location on the way to wealthy Western Europe. Furthermore, the collapse of the Communist regime removed some previous obstacles. The emergence of “Chinese markets” in these countries since the 1990s reflects the changing nature of Chinese emigration. Unlike old migrants who emigrate to and settle down in a certain country, these migrants tend to be continuously shifting among various host countries.

Second, Chinese in Europe and Japan may have several very different occupations in different countries at the same time. For example, a small business owner in an Eastern European country may be a student in a Western European country or have a low skilled part-time job at the same time.

Third, since the late 1980s, there has been a significant increase in self-financed language or college study abroad program among Chinese (Nyiri, 2002: 2). Apart from learning the language of the host country, entering a language school or college may also be a tool to obtain a residence permit that allows the holder to work (legally or illegally) in the host country. For many, it is just a way to obtain a much higher income than they can get in China. Some Chinese students simply register in the school and pay the tuition fee but do not attend any course. In the past years as China’s economy was booming, many middle-class family or “new rich” can afford to send their children to study abroad at colleges or even high schools. The phenomenon of “little students abroad” has become significant.
Fourth, in terms of sending areas, Dongbei (three provinces in north-east China) has become a prominent origin of emigrants since the end of the 1990s (Pang, 2004). This is mainly because of the restructuring of State-owned enterprises during this time and laying off of workers. Dongbei has long hosted heavy industry and is thus substantially impacted.

1.3.3 Migration networks

Existing theories suggest that there is a Chinese network at the European level as a result of chain migration and made up of transnational communities, such as the HK Chinese, Zhejiang Chinese, Vietnamese Chinese, or even subdivisions thereof. One example of such a network is the, European Confederation of Qintian Chinese. According to Pieke, these core communities migrate to and spread across Europe largely independently of each other and interact sporadically, although they sometimes temporarily create unified Chinese communities (Pieke 1998).

Many overseas Chinese invest extensively in Hong Kong and the Mainland, in the areas of industrial manufacturing, real estate, restaurants, and even agriculture. Some are involved in poverty-relief projects in Mainland China, helping poor peasants. Some others act as traders or brokers between China and host countries. Import and export products include produce, furniture, garments, alcohol, diamonds, chocolate, wine, technology, flowers and so on. Some overseas Chinese engage in academic activities, art exhibitions, religious activities or social and cultural activities organized by religious groups, organized visits to the home town for the second generation who are seeking their roots, and donations for development, aid following natural disasters, or for poverty relief projects in China.

The ethnic network appears to be important. Existing literature has illustrated how overseas Chinese businesses actively use their ethnic and social-economic networks to increase their profits and opportunities in the global economy (Froschauer 1997, Mitchell 1995, Ong and Nonini 1997, etc).

Some literature emphasized personal connections (guan xi) as the important characteristic of the Chinese business. It seems to be common knowledge that running a business in China needs good connections. Many overseas Chinese benefited from their good relationship with the Chinese officials. Nevertheless,

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33 Academics have developed some terminologies for this phenomenon such as “bamboo network” and “guanxi capitalism.” See Nyiri, “The ‘new migrants’: State and market constructions of modernity and patriotism,” in Nyiri & Breidenbach (eds.), China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese nationalism and transnationalism, 2005, pp. 170-171.
we should bear in mind that the lack of transparency and corruption in Mainland China at least contributes to this phenomenon, if it is not the determining factor. The cultural element should thus not be overemphasized.

1.3.4 Migration policies

The increasing presence of the “new migrants” from Mainland China is closely related to the policy of China. Since the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, there had been a strict control over freedom of movement of the Chinese population both in terms of internal movement and cross border movement. Obtaining a passport was extremely difficult. Since the economic reform and the “opening-up” policy started in the 1980s, China gradually loosened its control on the exit of its populations through simplified procedure for obtaining a passport and constantly increasing quota for foreign exchange. These policy changes facilitate the emigration of the Chinese from the Mainland and the so-called “new migrants” started to increasingly appear in Europe and America.

At the same time that the Chinese Government is taking active measures to stem irregular migration, it also is fostering programmes to induce skilled and talented professionals to return and thus counteract the “brain drain” phenomenon. It is estimated that there are more than 300,000 Chinese emigrants working abroad in high value added industries, according to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ 2007 Blue Book on Global Politics and Security.

Research shows that the Chinese government has a very active policy towards overseas Chinese. The purpose of the policy is both political and economic. The national government, after 1977, established a number of political bodies for the dual purpose of dealing with overseas Chinese and protecting the interests of returned overseas Chinese and their family members in China, who had experienced severe repression in the pre-reform era. The main task of these institutions is to attract overseas Chinese investment and to win back their confidence and loyalty. Especially after the 1989 Tiananmen square incident, intensive visits took place between Chinese government delegations and overseas Chinese associations. During that period of time, the Chinese

34 The dichotomy of “old migrants” and “new migrants” has become a quasi-official discourse for the Chinese emigrants. The former refers to the Chinese immigrating to other countries before the 1980s; the latter refers to the Mainland Chinese emigrants after the 1980s when Mainland China started its “opening up” policy and the economic reform. See, for example, Nyiri, “The ‘new migrants’: State and market constructions of modernity and patriotism”, in Nyiri & Breidenbach (eds.), China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese nationalism and transnationalism, 2005, pp. 154-155.

government needed support and investment from overseas Chinese more than ever due to the economic sanctions imposed by the West on China.

The relationship between the overseas Chinese associations and the Chinese government deserves close attention. It is the task of the Chinese embassies to build up and maintain a good relationship with the overseas Chinese associations. The embassy also has the task to “guide” (yīn dao) the overseas Chinese. Every year, there are three important events where leaders are invited to the reception of the Embassy: the spring festival, 1st October (national day of PRC), and 1st August (anniversary of the Chinese Army). When senior officials visit the host country, association leaders are often invited. Donations for development projects in China or for relief aid following natural disasters are often collected and transferred by the Embassy. The Embassy also invites leaders to attend events organized for overseas Chinese by the Chinese government in China. For instance, every year, there is a one-week training program for middle-aged and young overseas Chinese leaders (qiao lin) held in different places in China.


Local authorities of some areas in China, which have a long tradition of emigration such as Fujian Province, have a written or non-written policy to encourage and facilitate such emigration. Such policies not only exist before the departure, but also during the visit of emigrants or return, such as ritual activities, visiting the family left behind during important days such as the spring festival, encouraging investment in industry, schools and other public infrastructures. (Pieke, 2004)

2. METHODS

2.1 Justification of the selection

The case study of China selected the Three-Gorge Dam migrants resettled in coastal regions as the main subject of research and fieldwork. More specifically,

37 See the official website of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, available at www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node147/userobject7ai2375.html (last visit by 2 June 2007).
the field work chose Chongming Island of Shanghai Municipality, Jiashan County of Zhejiang Province, Jiangsu Province as sites for in-depth interviews with migrants. These selections were made because of their representativeness and the feasibility of the fieldwork.

The case of TGD migrants is representative because it involves more than one million migrants directly impacted by the construction of the dam. Moreover, official sources state that, in the near future, more than two million of people will be resettled due to the degradation of the environment and ecological system related to the construction of the dam. The sheer number of people affected by the development project illustrates the relevance of the selection. The diversity of resettlement models, which involves settlement in nearby region, remote areas, and the faraway coastal region also illustrates the relevance of the case. Furthermore, the empirical research on resettled TGD migrants not only provides rich information on the migration that occurred, but can also be used for planning for and managing future migration induced by the TGD construction.

The selection of the above-mentioned resettlement sites in the coastal region was also based on the consideration of its feasibility. Due to limited resources of the project, conducting a full range of interviews on the issue in a country with such a vast geographical span and large population as China is impossible. Moreover, the existing research and reports at the international level appear to focus on near-by resettlement and leave a gap in the empirical research on the resettlement in the coastal region. The current selection was an attempt to help fill in the gap. Furthermore, the resettlement in the coastal region has unique characteristics compared to nearby resettlement. Migrants who have to move to a region which is thousands of kilometers away from their home town face all types of challenges, including language differences, lack of a social network, different life style, different economic structure, different cultivating methods, etc. Thus, the focus on TGD migrants resettled in the coastal regions provides a unique perspective and rich information for the research project.

2.2 Discussion of methods

The fieldwork included in-depth interviews with experts and migrants. The fieldwork did not use the designed questionnaire because most of questions listed in the questionnaire do not fit the fieldwork. In the case of TGD migration, the whole migration process was initiated and planned by the government. The individual choice of the migrants was very limited. Their resettlement was arranged by the State instead of being directly driven by environmental degradation.

Some expert interviews were recorded with express consent of the interviewee while others refused to be recorded. Migrant interviews were noted but not
recorded based on the consideration that, given the sensitivity of the issue, recording may result in the refusal of the interview or affect the quality of the interview.

3. FIELDWORK FINDINGS

3.1 From expert interviews

The expert interviews were mainly conducted in Beijing as well as some in Shanghai and Nanjing. Here are some major findings from expert interviews.

First, with regard to the attitude of the government towards environmental protection and migration related to environmental changes, it appears that two stages can be identified: pre-reform and post-reform era.

During the pre-reform era (1949-1978), environment induced migration was mainly due to desertification, floods and the construction of large-scale development projects such as railways, reservoirs, and mines. Desertification mainly occurs in the northwest part of China and causes forced migration when desertification lowers the living conditions of residents in the area, such as destruction of houses by sandstorms. In some cases such as in Inner Mongolia (see parallel EACH-FOR Case Study), the government initiated resettlement of local residents for the purpose of the reforestation of the grassland at risk of desertification. Although with good intentions, the methods used to facilitate migration were often oversimplified and did not take into account all relevant factors. For example, the policy often lacked consistent standards and lacked consultation with migrants. As a consequence, many migrants encountered many problems, especially in terms of living conditions and employment after resettlement. For instance, they often had poor housing in the resettlement sites. An extreme example given by more than one expert is that some houses built by the government for the resettlement did not have windows. Compensation standards were quite low according to one expert, although more specific information about compensation is not available. While many migrants made a living through agricultural activities, their production needs were not fully considered by the government. For example, in some cases, the irrigation system was not ready when migrants moved to the new location.

During the reform and post-reform era, development-caused migration becomes more significant because of the massive infrastructure development stimulated by the economic development in China, which often involves relocation of thousands of people. Over time, the government developed a more sophisticated resettlement policy, taking into account the living conditions of resettled people. A general objective of the policy is that the living conditions after the resettlement should not be lower than before the resettlement. For example,
the Migration Department of the State Development and Reform Commission has detailed standards on migration. Moreover, the government attitude towards environmental protection becomes friendlier, especially in recent years. For development projects, the EIA (environment impact assessment) is required. One interviewed expert claimed that the resettlement nowadays is beneficial for migrants because they are often relocated from mountain area to the economically more developed areas which are closer to the highway or towns and counties. Especially, children of migrants can benefit from better education.

Second, there are irregularities in the resettlement process. According to expert interviewees, major problems lie in the compensation. One possible explanation may be the lack of coordination among different departments that deal with resettlement issues. For example, if the project is reservoir construction, the Ministry of Hydrology will be the competent authority to administer the resettlement. If the project is the construction of highways, the Ministry of Transportation will be responsible for the resettlement.

Third, migrants often have problems with adapting to life after resettlement especially in terms of finding employment. Although local authorities may provide vocational training, some training is not helpful. In some cases, local authorities directly arrange employment for migrants.

Fourth, for the population in the coastal region, a serious environmental problem is water pollution, which directly damages people’s health. One expert identified a so-called “DDM” situation: degradation, diseases, and migration. Resettlement often occurs from villages to the close-by cities. Although rural-urban migration is by and large driven by economic factors, safer drinking water in cities could be a factor that migrants take into account while making resettlement decisions. Social elements are also relevant. Economically well-off people tend to be more sensitive to environment-related health issues and have more capacity for resettlement. More distant resettlement between different provinces or regions also exists. For example, one expert observed that some economically well-off coastal residents started buying property in the hinterland region such as Yunnan Province based on concerns about issues such as safe drinking water and air pollution. He predicts that the trend will become more visible in the future, Presently however, the number of such migrants is not statistically significant.

Fifth, concerning the TGD migrants resettled in the coastal region, there are specific rules and regulations for resettlement at the national and local level. Since May 2006, the State Council issued the post-resettlement assistance

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38 For more details about the government policy on resettlement, see Shi Guoqin, Chen Shaojun, Xiang Hezu, & Xun Houping, China Resettlement Policy and Practice (Zhongguo Yimin Zhengce yu Shijian), 2001, NinxiaRenmin Publisher.
policy. Accordingly, each migrant should receive a 600 yuan allowances (equivalent to around 60 Euros) each year, which shall continue for 20 years. When asked whether 600 yuan is a useful amount, the expert interviewed claimed that according to their survey, this money achieved the level of the living conditions of poor counties and should allow basic living conditions. However, this allowance has not yet been adjusted according to the increase of consumer prices.

Considering the question whether TGD migrants can choose the resettlement locations, experts claim that the migrant can choose between near-by resettlement and “outside resettlement” which includes resettlement in other provinces and in the coastal region. One expert observed that migrants who choose “outside resettlement” tend to have a higher education level although there are no statistical data available to support such an observation. The same expert also observed that young people are more likely to choose “outside resettlement” and most of them already have been working in other provinces as internal migrant workers. Older people are less likely to choose “outside resettlement” while some of them had to move far-away together with their adult children who chose to do so. No significant gender differences have been observed.

With regards to resettlement in the coastal region, local authorities at the provincial level have different policies in accordance with the circumstances of the province, especially regarding the availability of land because the majority of TGD migrants are peasants. Housing and agriculture land are among the most important issues regarding resettlement. In Jiangsu Province, Chongmin Island of Shanghai, and Zhejiang Province, the general policy is “big concentration, small dispersement” (da ji zhong, xiao fen san), which means that TGD migrants are distributed to certain counties but each village shares 2-4 migrant families. The main reason for this to reduce the pressure of land distribution. In this way, each village needs to contribute only a small piece of land to migrants, without transferring too much land from local residents to migrants. In Fujian Province, all migrants are concentrated in State-owned farms.

With regard to housing construction, the policy in Zhejiang Province is to build new houses for migrants, combined with buying old houses. In Jiangsu Province, no new houses were built at all for migrants and more than 7000 migrants bought old houses instead. In Chongmin Island of the Shanghai Municipality, all migrant houses are specifically built for migrants.

The payment for housing mainly came from State housing allowances, savings of migrants, and local subsidies. Commercial bank loans for housing are not available for migrants. With regard to local subsidies, there is no standard compensation and it was completely up to the willingness and the financial
capacity of the local authorities. In Guangdong Province, the local subsidy can reach 30,000 yuan for each migrant family. But the money did not go directly to the pocket of migrants but subsidized the cost of land. In Zhejiang Province, there was no subsidy for individual migrants but local residents provided labour, such as flattening the land for migrants.

With regard to living means after resettlement, many TGD migrants still work on the land. Nevertheless, they encountered problems with different land quality and cultivating methods in the receiving areas. Although often provided with technical assistance by the local authorities and local residents, the production is not so easy. Some local authorities appointed one or two local families to help migrants. Many migrants used to cultivate fruits and vegetables in their hometown. Now they have to cultivate local products such as grains. Many migrants had difficulty adapting to the new production methods. With regards to employment opportunities, according to experts, there is some employment placement by local authorities. For example, in Zhejiang Province and Fujian Province, each migrant family has one person placed in the local factory for employment. Whether migrants can adjust to the industrial work depends on personal qualifications. In Shanghai, free vocational training is available for TGD migrants such as driving. Training programs depend on the qualifications of individual migrants. Many migrants resettled in Chongmin Island went to Shanghai for employment while a few went to other provinces including their hometown for work.

With regards to adaptation of TGD migrants to life after the resettlement and integration in the coastal region, one expert identified the three-step process: resettlement—adaptation-- integration. Experts who conducted 4 to 5 years of empirical research with TGD migrants in Chongmin Island found integration among the first TGD migrants after 4 years of resettlement. TGD migrant children all speak well the local dialect of Chongmin Island while elder people cannot, even after several years of resettlement. Experts also observed many cases of marriage between local males and migrant females while marriage between local female and migrant male is rather rare.

In Chongmin Island, according to experts, TGD migrants are treated as “special citizens” because they sacrificed their own home for the sake of all people. Local authorities regard the resettlement as a “political task” which has to be completed successfully and encourage local residents to welcome TGD migrants. Experts also observed that during the first year of resettlement, migrants tend to unite with concerns of being bullied by local residents.

In another receiving area for TGD migrants in Shanghai, Nanhui District, local authorities recruited one migrant as a representative of TGD migrants who participated in every meeting concerning the TGD migrants. Consequently, the resettlement was smooth and successful in Nanhui District because the policy
earned more credit through the participation in the decision-making process by a migrant representative.

3.2 From migrant interviews

Interviews with migrants were conducted in Chongming Island of Shanghai Municipality, the Jiashan County of Zhejiang Province, Jining Municipality of Shandong Province, and Rudong County of Jiangsu Province. Resettlement in Shanghai and three provinces follows the policy of “big dispersement and small concentration”. As such, each village hosts several TGD migrant families. Interviews were often conducted with several migrant families in one resettlement site at the same time.

Altogether 30 questionnaires were conducted and 10 in-depth interviews were completed. Interviews in Shandong Province and Jiangsu Province were conducted by the subcontracted research institute in China.

Shanghai Municipality

--Chongming Island (County): Miao Town, 5 families; Gangxi Town, Beishuang Village, 3 families; Jianshe Town, Hongqiao Village, 3 families;

Zhejiang Province

--Jiashan County: Xitang Town, Donghui Village, 6 families; Ganyao Town, Yuzhao Village, 3 families; Hongxi Town, Hongnan Village, 2 families

Jiangsu Province

--Rudong County: various towns

Shandong Province

--Jinan Municipality, Licheng District

3.2.1 Employment

Regarding employment opportunities, many migrants see the lack of a social network and language as the main obstacles for finding employment. During the first years of the resettlement, finding employment and self-employment is fairly difficult. One interviewee said he tried to sell fruit in the beginning of the resettlement in Chongming Island but failed to sell anything since he cannot communicate with local customers. Even after several years of resettlement, some TGD migrants still cannot find employment and have to live by cultivating land and limited social allowances. These unemployed migrants very often cannot speak local dialect although they can understand it after years of
resettlement. Most of them are poorly educated and low-skilled. Many of them are women.

Nevertheless, the degree of difficulty in employment varies according to the resettlement areas and policy of local authorities, and the individual conditions of migrants.

In Shanghai, it appears that the local authorities provide notable assistance to TGD migrants. Each migrant family obtain a piece of land which is close to their house. The researcher met several migrant families that make a living only by farming and State assistance. Some migrant families have a family member making a living by wage employment. For example, a son of a one migrant family drives a taxi in Shanghai. One interviewee, who is now considered as a successful example for resettlement of TGD migrants, is running a small tailor shop in Chongming Island. She used to be a tailor for one year before the resettlement. After she arrived at Chongming Island, she found that the demands of local customers are higher than her customers in the home town. She returned to her hometown to study tailoring for two months because she could not learn it in Chongming in the local dialect. According to her, it was very difficult to run the shop in the beginning but she obtained lot of help from the local government which helped her to find the current premises of the shop and assisted her with free TV and radio advertising. Taking into account all relevant factors, her success is closely related to her own skills and assistance from the local government of the resettlement area. Nevertheless, her case might not be representative. Interviews with other migrants show that such assistance from the local government is not always available or so effective. Many migrant peasants still live by farming as they did in their place of origin. At the beginning of their resettlement, the village authorities designated one local family, usually, the close neighbour of the TGD migrant family, to teach the migrants how to cultivate the land because the agricultural conditions are different from the migrant’s home town. Nevertheless, one migrant complained that the land is that left over by the local people and in the marginal area of the village, with low productivity. After the resettlement, his family had to work hard to improve the quality of the land.

In Zhejiang Province, the situation is different from that in Shanghai. Each migrant family also obtained a piece of land. The interviewed migrants did not receive any assistance from the local authorities on how to cultivate the land. Most of the migrant families interviewed subcontracted out their land to the local people and live on small business (selling barbecue on the street). Asked about the reason for subcontracting, they answered that they were unable to make living on the land because they did not know how to cultivate the local products. They also complained that their small business was going down because of competition. Many of these interviewed migrants have received primary school
education only. One migrant family lives on farming. But they had conflicts with the village authorities because the migrants wanted to plant fruits but the authorities did not allow that and required them to plant rice instead. After several rounds of bargaining and conflicts, they finally got to plant fruits as they wished. Another young migrant family lives on wage employment. Both the wife and the husband work in local factories. They both had middle school education. The wife started to work in Jiashan before she was resettled as a TDG migrant. Her sister is a university graduate and works in Shanghai.

In Shandong Province, TGD migrants were resettled in places where the economy is relatively developed. Each migrant family also obtained a piece of land which is of similar size to the land of local residents. In the area where interviews were conducted, in many migrant families those who can work migrate again to work in other cities such as Beijing and Shenzhen. Some went back to their home town to work. As the receiving town has developed a collective economy, the land of the migrant family is cultivated by the village collectively. Some migrants run small businesses in the town such as restaurants. When migrants request assistance from the local authorities in terms of opening their own business, normally they obtain such help in the form of finding a location for running the business and facilitating the paper work procedure.

In Jiangsu Province, each migrant family has a piece of land. Since the local economy in Jiangsu Province is relatively developed, especially in terms of the village and township factories, many migrants found employment in these local factories. Some migrants started their own factory and run successful businesses.

3.2.2 Housing

In Chongming Island, from three to four migrants families are resettled as neighbours. One village can hold several of this type of TGD migrant neighbours. The local authorities built new houses with two floors for each migrant family. Before migrants arrived, each migrant family could send one family representative to visit the piece of land where their house would be built and to see the blueprint of the house. Compared to the neighbouring houses of local residents, the TGD migrants’ houses are more aesthetically pleasant on the exterior. Nevertheless, the majority of migrant houses are in the original style and did not have inner renovation as took place with the houses of many local residents. A minority of migrants decorated upstairs such as bedrooms and toilet. When migrants arrived at their new house, they found stoves with gas bottles in the kitchen and some basic furniture such as tables and chairs. Treatment is slightly different among migrants who arrived at different times. Some migrants found rice and cooking oil and some basic daily provisions in their new house.
In Jiashan of Zhejiang Province, the housing situation is different. Some families built a new house and some bought an old house. The consequence is that migrant families are not so concentrated in one location as is the case of Chongming Island. The migrant families with lower financial ability can only afford to live in relatively small houses.

In Jiangsu Province, the policy is that TGD migrants buy the unwanted houses on the local market. As such, like the situation in Jiashan of Zhejiang Province, migrant families are not necessarily neighbouring with each other. Also, migrants’ houses are comparatively of lower conditions than local residents’ houses. Consequently, although many migrants said their living conditions are now better than before the resettlement, they are not satisfied with the current conditions because they are not equal with local residents.

In the town of Shandong Province, the housing conditions of TGD migrants are comparable to those of Chongming Island, as the local authorities built new houses for migrants. TGD migrants’ living conditions are equivalent to or even better than those of local residents. Also, because the local collective economy is quite developed, migrant families receive daily living provisions such as rice, oil, vegetables just as local residents do.

3.2.3 Integration

In terms of integration, TGD migrants resettled in four provinces share some common characteristics. Almost all interviewed migrants have language difficulties during the first years of resettlement as the local dialect of the receiving areas is different from their mother dialect. Nevertheless, there is difference of degree in terms of the language difficulty. For TGD migrants resettled in Shandong and Jiangsu Province, the language difference between local dialect and their mother tongue is less significant than for those resettled in Shanghai and Zhejiang Province. Very few TGD migrants said they had actively learnt the local dialect of the receiving areas. After several years of resettlement, most of the migrants can understand the local dialect but they cannot speak it well. Their children picked up the local dialect very quickly and can both understand and speak like local residents. When migrants communicate with local residents, the majority of them speak mandarin Chinese. But most of the older generation still cannot understand the local dialect even after several years of resettlement.

In terms of adjustment to the local customs, many migrants complained that the local customs are too complicated but they said they should accept them since they have resettled there.
In terms of marriage with local residents, it appears that it is more likely that migrant women would marry local men but not otherwise. It may be connected with the traditional view that the husband should have better economic conditions than his wife. In general, migrant families are less wealthy than local families.

In terms of life style, many migrants said that they could not adjust to the life in the coastal region during first years of resettlement. As most of the TGD migrants are from Sichuan Province where people eat very spicy food with special taste, they did not like the food in the coastal region where people eat a lot of sea food but not spicy. But after several years, they became used to it. For example, many interviewed migrants said they now eat just like local people and do not eat spicy food anymore.

In general, for migrant children, there do not seem to be any problems with integration. But for older people, integration is very difficult.

4. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

In general, State policies on TGD migration are respected in terms of housing, land and financial assistance, although there is a difference of degree, depending on the province, municipality, town or even village where migrants were resettled. Resettlement in the coastal region is generally smooth as the local economy is the most developed in China and the receiving areas have the financial ability to afford assistance to TGD migrants. All migrant families have decent sized housing and a piece of land for farming if they were farmers before the resettlement. Their children can go to local schools although financial assistance in education to migrant children varies from one town to another.

In general, migrants have equivalent or even better living conditions than in their home town. Nevertheless, compared to local residents, their living conditions are often of lower status. As such, they are not very satisfied with their current situation. The majority of the migrants interviewed complained about their life. Very few migrants show a positive attitude. Most of them stated however that their children will have a better future than they could have in their home town because the local economy in the coastal region is more developed and their children should have more opportunities. Also, as TGD migrants have family members such as brothers and sisters resettled in other provinces, they tend to compare the living conditions among each other. When they know their relatives in other province or towns received better treatment and live better, they tend to be more unsatisfied with their own situation than they likely otherwise would have been.
To sum up, there are some common problems faced by TGD migrants resettled in the coastal region as evidenced by interviews as follows.

First, different land quality and farming methods in the resettlement area from their home town create difficulties for migrants to live on farming.

Second, although all TGD migrants received housing compensation and financial assistance for housing cost, the standard is not sufficiently transparent and the way of distribution is different from one province to another. State policy provides only general guidelines and leaves much discretion to local authorities for decisions according to the local resources and other circumstances. This approach is partially justified as China is such a big country with huge regional and provincial disparities in many aspects. Some provinces such as Shanghai provide free interest housing loans to TGD migrants and do not really expect them to repay it. Some provinces do not provide any government loans and commercial loans are not available either. For provinces where the local authorities built new houses for TGD migrants, the house is normally in decent condition. In provinces where the TGD migrants have to buy a house or build one by themselves, migrants often feel that there is a financial burden in having satisfactory housing.

Third, one of the biggest complaints of the TGD migrants is the difficulty in finding employment due to various factors: language difficulties, lack of networking, low employability of migrants because many of them are poorly educated, lack of government assistance and training; and, lack of access to financial means for running small businesses.

Fourth, as family members of TGD migrants can be resettled in different provinces, care of older people in the family become difficult. Before the resettlement, care of the older people is often shared by brothers and sisters who live in the same town or nearby. The resettlement may send brothers and sisters to different areas. In this case, care of the older people becomes burdensome for the child who lives with them.

The following conclusions can be drawn based on the information and analysis above.

First, TGD migrants in general do not have many alternatives in choosing the location of resettlement. As a result, parents and their adult brothers and sisters may be forced to be resettled in different provinces that are far away from each other. This is also the case for friends. Cutting such family and social ties which migrants did not choose voluntarily may be the most crucial aspect of such forced migration. The defense of such policy may be that the huge number of migrants involved makes free individual choice of location impractical if not
impossible. Moreover, most TGD migrants did not have any knowledge about the receiving area before the resettlement. This may be partially due to the low level of education of migrants, but the State should have been able to provide more pre-resettlement education and training to migrants. As such, the decision made by migrants given the very limited options is not based on adequate information. Although each family can send one member to visit the receiving place, such a visit is very short and does not allow for any impactful decision-making.

Second, many migrants said they earned a similar income or higher income than they did in the home town. This is rather because the local economy in the coastal region is the most developed in China. However, the social cost is huge during such a migration process. Migrants lost their social network and have to be separated from their close family members such as brothers, sisters or even parents. The only psychological preparation they have may be that they were told that migration is a sacrifice for the country and for other people and they realized they had no choice but to leave.

Third, local policy makes important difference for the adjustment and life of TGD migrants after resettlement. TGD migrants tend to live in better conditions in the places where local authorities have a more friendly policy towards them than otherwise.

Fourth, the example of Chongming Island of Shanghai illustrates that participation of migrants in decision-making is helpful. It is mutually beneficial for migrants and for local authorities. In this way, migrants are more likely to accept the local policy as they felt that their opinions and circumstances are taken into account. For local authorities, this method can help them to understand the opinions and demands of the migrants and help them to issue more practical policies. In fact, the participation in the decision-making seems to be missing from the beginning of policy-making on the TGD migration at both the national level and local level. The voice of the affected population is not sufficiently represented during the decision-making process. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that lack of civil participation in the decision-making process is a general problem in China and needs to be tackled as a whole.

Fifth, from migrant interviews, the study does not find direct evidence of corruption of financial compensation or serious mistreatment of TGD migrants. However, there are individual complaints from TGD migrants about local authorities at the township level about the use of land. Some migrants tried to plead before the higher authorities but were prevented from doing so by the local authorities. This incident is to be understood in the general picture of China where a large number of people were denied access to justice due to the
obstruction of the local authorities. Some expert interviews provide further evidence to that.

Lastly, the individual conditions of migrants have an important impact on the life after resettlement, such as the education level, language ability, age, and professional skills. In general, younger people with better education tend to have an easier adjustment process after the resettlement, while older people have most difficulties. It is also worth noting that gender does not seem to make significant difference in the life of migrants after the resettlement.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Research on TGD migration can be illustrative for studying other large-scale involuntary migration caused by development projects. It provides rich information on almost all aspects of this type of migration.

It is to be noted that the TGD migration, because of the sheer number of people it affected, requires the particular attention of the government, which issued specific policies for organizing the whole migration process. For authorities in the receiving areas, it is a political task to organize the resettlement well in order to maintain social stability, which is amongst the top concerns of the Chinese government.

It is also to be emphasized that the above analysis and conclusions are based on interviews carried out in four coastal provinces only and thus may have limited application. It is in the author’s belief that the result of interviews can be representative for the TGD migrants in these four provinces or even the whole coastal region, which share some similarities such as the geographic features, and the level of the economic development, a more functional legal and bureaucratic system than other regions, and maybe a lower level of corruption. In fact, given the limited resources, it was not the original intention for this study to present a detailed picture of the TGD migration nation wide. As such, the findings of this case study may be surprising for those who are familiar with international literature on the TGD migration in general, many of which rather emphasise the plight of migrants and the corruption of local authorities. While not denying that findings of the existing literature about TGD migration are at least partially reliable, we cannot believe that the existing literature has told the whole story based on the interviews conducted by the EACH-FOR project. This empirical study contributes to depicting a more representative and objective picture of the TGD migration by filling in a micro aspect of the TGD migration.

The fieldwork carried out for the EACH-FOR project focuses on part of the TGD migration, namely, resettlement in the coastal region of China. The disparity
between the sending area and the receiving area may be comparable to that of a cross-border migration.

Given the restrictions of resources, this study could only cover four provinces. As provincial disparity in the same region is also significant in China, it would be useful if future research could cover other provinces. It would also be meaningful to conduct some follow-up research on the adjustment to life after the resettlement.

Lastly, as the TGD project plans to further resettle millions of people in the dam area in the near future, which is caused by the deterioration of the environment after the dam construction rather than by the construction itself, research on that process would contribute to giving a full picture of the issue and provide a good example for the case study on development project induced migration.

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